基于三群体演化博弈的小额贷款公司风险补贴机制研究

Research for Risk Subsidy Mechanism of Small Loan Companies Based on Evolutionary Game in Three Groups

本文利用三群体演化博弈模型,研究了在政府贷款风险补贴政策下,政府、小额贷款公司、小微企业的演化稳定策略。研究得出:政府补贴对象应是经营担保贷款的小额贷款公司;小额贷款公司应采取差额担保机制,并确保担保贷款优于信用贷款;小额贷款公司应根据小微企业项目投资成功率,将小微企业划分为优质客户和一般客户,对优质客户贷款,政府补贴率要使得补贴激励效用大于成本,对一般客户贷款,政府补贴率要进一步细化,确定一个补贴率下限值,实际值要接近这一下限;政府要健全小额信贷征信制度,提高小额贷款公司风险防控能力和获利能力,优化项目投资软环境,使政府在较低补贴率下发挥出较高的补贴激励效用。

This article analysizes the evolutionary stable strategy of the government, small loan companies, and small micro enterprise under loan risk subsidy given by the government, utilizing evolutionary game model in three groups. Conclusions show that： the government should give subsidy to the small loan companies which manage guaranteed loan; small loan companies should divide small and micro enterprises into high-quality customers and general customers according to their investment success rate ; for ＂high-quality customers ＇ loan, the government subsidy rate should guaran- tee that the incentive effect is greater than the cost of subsidy. While for general customers＇ loan, the government should refine the subsidy rate further and determine a lower bound which is supposed to be close to the actual value ; the government should strengthen the microfinanee credit reporting system, improve the small 10an company＇ s ability of risk prevention and control, and profitability, optimize the soft environment of project investment, so that the government can exert higher subsidy incentive effect under the lower subsidy rate.