服务质量不可观测下的云外包激励机制

Incentive Mechanism Designs for Cloud Outsourcing under Unobserved Service Quality

客户企业实施云外包时,面临着服务质量信息不对称所带来的风险。针对在"一对多"的云外包服务模式下,因云服务提供商(CSP)服务质量不可观测所引发的共同代理问题,以客户企业期望收入最大化为目标,分别在客户企业合作及不合作情况下,设计外包合同以激励CSP付出最优的服务质量水平,并对两种情况下的合同激励效果进行比较分析。研究表明:当客户企业之间合作时,收益共享系数由服务质量对产出的影响系数、风险规避度、产出方差和成本效率参数所决定;当不合作时,具有先动优势的客户企业不会向CSP支付固定服务报酬;客户企业之间合作时的合同激励效果要优于不合作时的激励效果。

There exists risk caused by asymmetric service quality information when customer enterprise carries out the outsourcing service in cloud.This paper studied the common agency problem caused by the unobserved service quality provided by the cloud service provider（CSP）as the customer enterprise adopted one-to-many cloud outsourcing service mode.The outsourcing contract is designed to incentive CSP to provide the optimal service quality level when the enterprises cooperate or not,respectively,and the two corresponding contract incentive effects were compared then.The conclusions imply that revenue sharing proportion is determined by the coefficient reflecting the impact of service quality on the output,risk aversion degree,cost efficiency parameters under one-to-many cloud outsourcing service mode.The customer enterprise with first-mover advantage will not pay fixed service compensation to CSP.Moreover,the incentive effect of contract under customer enterprises＇ cooperation is better than noncooperation.