摘要
构造了农民工社会融合过程中社会风险产生的多阶段动态博弈模型,分析了新生代农民工群体在社会融合过程中资源禀赋不合理及其引发的社会风险。提出了农民工群体在政府采取不同策略的情况下选择抗争和妥协策略的约束条件,以及产生短期和长期社会风险的发生机理。结果表明除了农民工群体的心理平衡因素之外,农民工群体不同策略的收益差距是决定社会风险发生的影响因素之一,政府的态度选择是社会风险发生的另一个重要因素。
The multi-stage dynamic game theory model of social risks in migrant workers' social integration is conducted, and the unreasonable resources endowment and the resultant social risksexperienced by the new-generation migrant workers are explored.The constrains of migrant workers in choosing struggle or compromise strategies are put forward when the government takes different strategies,and the generation mechanisms of short-term and long-term social risks are analyzed.The results indicate that apart from the psychological balance of the migrant worker group,there turns gap of different strategies taken by the migrant worker group and the attitude of the government are key factors for influencing social risks.
出处
《东北大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第5期483-488,共6页
Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)
基金
国家软科学研究计划资助项目(2013GXS4D113)
关键词
新生代农民工
社会融合
社会风险
动态博弈
new-generation migrant worker
social integration
social risk
dynamic game theory