摘要
作为最高之善,幸福就是灵魂合乎德性(美德)的生活。这是亚里士多德幸福观的一个基本观点,但并不是其幸福观的独特之处。其灵魂学说,特别是其中关于"理性"划分为"理性本身"与"在欲求力里的理性"或"被欲求力分有的理性",不仅构成了亚里士多德幸福理论的基础,而且也构成了其幸福学说的特别之处。通过这个区分,亚里士多德找到了成就"伦理德性"的基础,同时也确定了理性本身的活动也即"纯粹理论活动"之所以高于理性的"实践活动"的理由。因而,虽然合乎伦理德性的生活是幸福的,但却只是"次级的幸福",只有合乎理智德性的生活才是真正最高的幸福。这种生活一方面是合乎神性的生活,另一方面又是成就每个人真正自己的生活。这意味着,在亚里士多德那里,幸福并非只关乎人性,亦关乎神性。
As the highest good, happiness is a certain kind of activity of the soul in accordance with complete virtue. But this cannot be the unique merit of Aristotle’s theory happiness. There does seem to be two parts in the soul: the one has reason, while the other lacks it, and reason has been divided into two elements accordingly: the oner consisting in appetite and desire in general (from the part without reason) does share reason, in so far as it listens to and o-beys reason. This distinction forms the peculiarity and the basis of Aristotle’s theory of happiness. In this way, Aristotle establi-shes the foundation of the virtues of character ( ethics virtues) and the reason why the activity of reason itself, namely , pure speculation is superior to rational practice. Therefore , only if someone lives in line with intellectual virtue , the highest happi-ness will be performed. This sort of life not only makes him in line with divinitmeans that happiness depends on human nature and especially divinity.
出处
《云南大学学报(社会科学版)》
北大核心
2017年第5期5-20,共16页
The Journal of Yunnan University:Social Sciences Edition
关键词
目的
幸福
伦理德性
理智德性
end
happiness
virtue of character (ethics virtue)
intellectual virtue