情感的缺陷及其化解--基于亚里士多德主义美德伦理学的辩护

The Defects of Emotion and Its Solution:A Defense based on Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

亚里士多德主义美德伦理学不仅提供了一套独特的实践推理方案,而且这套实践推理方案始终承认和伴随着情感。反对者认为,作为行为者在感性层面的感受和反应,情感既不够普遍或稳定,也不够精确或高尚,还不够清晰或彻底,难以得到充分的知识化或概念化,更难以被用来有效地解释或指导正确的行动。然而,期待一种普遍确定的情感反应,本身就是普遍主义预设的结果。情感的具体性与个体性是由伦理生活的背景和道德实践的情境所决定的,它并不能否认情感的真实性及其有效性。在亚里士多德主义的理解中,情感既不承诺也不等于美德,但它却是美德必不可少的构成物或伴随物。

Aristotelian virtue ethics provides a special model of practical wisdom that is always accommodated and accompanied with emotions. It is said of the opponents that emotions as the sentimental feelings and responses of agents are not so general or stable or accurate or noble and cannot be understood as knowledge or concepts, so that they cannot be competent of action-guiding. However, it is in itself the general presupposition to expect such a universal and stable kind of emotions. The specificity and individuality of human's emotions are determined by the background and context of their ethical life and moral practices, while it does not mean that the emotions are unreal or ineffective. According to Aristotelian virtue ethics, emotions do not equal with virtues, but they are the necessary constitutes or accompaniments of virtues