“政府—企业”碳排放决策理论研究——基于不完全信息博弈

Carbon Emissions Decisions of Government and Enterprises——Based on Incomplete Information Game Theory

通过构建"政府-企业"两部门的碳排放博弈模型,重点考察在政府不了解企业处理碳排放效率的(不完全信息)条件下,企业的最优碳排放行为和政府的最优政策制定。基于完全信息和不完全信息两种状态的比较,研究发现在政府完全掌握企业碳排放效率的情况下,碳排放许可制度反而使得碳排放总量趋高,排碳费用增加;而在政府不了解企业碳排放效率的不完全信息条件下,许可制度使得排碳总量降低、费用减少。由此证实,在市场机制下,政府的精力应当放在激励机制设计中,而并非去了解和掌握每个企业的碳排放效率。

By carbon emissions game model of two sectors （ government and enterprises）, this study focus on the governmental optimal policy and the optimal behavior of enterprises under incomplete information situation. It finds that when the govern- ment has complete information about the efficiencies of enterprises, the permits system will make the level of carbon emissions higher, and the cost of carbon emissions will increase. However, when the government doesn＇t have complete information, the permits system can decrease the total quantity of carbon emissions and reduce the cost. Therefore, the government should be engaged in the design of incentive mechanism instead of knowing the efficiency on carbon emissions of each enterprise.