环境类群体性事件中地方政府的行为模式及归因分析

Analysis of Local Government Behaviorial Patterns and Incentives in the Patterns of Environmental Mass Behavior

近年来，我国环境类群体性事件多发。在什邡钼铜事件、启东事件、宁波PX事件等环境类群体性事件中，地方政府都选择顺从民众意愿作为冲突化解的方式。这些案例为分析地方政府在环境类群体性事件中惯常采取“顺从式行为”的原因提供了可能。本文选取什邡钼铜事件这一典型案例，运用认知制度理论作为理论分析框架，从制度维度和认知维度分析政府“顺从式行为”的产生机制，并在对“顺从式行为”反思的基础上提出政府理性回应环境类群体性事件的政策建议，避免政府在环境类群体性事件的解决过程中出现绝对性失语。

In recent years, many environmental mass events have occurred in our country. In the Shifang event, the Qfdong event, the Ningbo event, and other environmental mass events, local governments chose to accept the will of the people in order to resolve the respective conflicts. These cases are likely to reveal the reasons why local governments are compliant with respect to environmental mass events. To understand this problem, this article, based on a cognitive institutional approach, is based on the case of the Shifang event. From the perspective of cognitive evolution, we look at the institutional factors to analyze the generation of government compliance behavior and we put forward policy recommendations regarding how compliant behavior evolves to rational behavior in order to avoid a government inability to resolve environmental mass incidents.