基层政策执行差异的成因与影响:2005年信访改革基层成效研究

The Causes and Consequences of Heterogeneous Policy Implementation in Rural China ——Evidence from the 2005 Reform of the System of Letters and Visits

本文基于有代表性的全国抽样数据，系统考察了2005年信访改革在农村基层的差异性影响。这次改革有效消减了农村信访数量，但消解大规模群体性上访的效果并不明显，甚至一定程度上刺激了非信访群体性事件。导致上述差异的关键，在于基层干部采用了不同手段和策略来执行消减信访的政策。在执行策略摇摆不定的村庄，消解信访可能额外激发制度外抗争；而在执行策略稳定的情况下，无论采用温和手段化解矛盾还是采用强硬手段压制抗争，都不会额外激发制度外抗争。造成基层干部出现执行手段和策略分野的原因，在于地方权力结构和资源禀赋的差异。

Based on data from a representative national survey, this article systemati- cally investigates the heterogeneous impacts of the 2005 reform of the system of letters and visits in rural China. Although the reform reduced the amount of letters and visits to all gov- ernment levels, it appears to have little effect on reducing large-scale collective petitioning, and it even triggered more transgressive collective tern, we argue, is due to the various means and plemented the reform. On the one hand, villages incidents. The key reason for such a pat- strategies by which grassroots cadres im- where local cadres implemented in con- sistent reform strategies experienced a more rapid increase in transgressive contention. On the other hand, we observe no significant differences with regard to the amount of trans- gressive contention in villages where local cadres implemented consistently repressive or me- diating reform strategies. The variations in means and strategies of local cadres to implement the reform, we suggest, depends on the power structure that they face and the resources at their disposal. More specifically, grassroots cadres are more likely to implement pragmatic strategies under non-local township leaders and hence are often more myopic, whereas they are more likely to implement stable strategies under indigenous township leaders. Moreover, in the latter situation, villages with sufficient public resources are more likely to establish ef- fective mechanisms for dispute resolution, whereas those lacking sufficient public resources face higher risks of involution.