摘要
政府资源配置方面存在着双层委托——代理关系;双层委托——代理关系中可能出现机会主义行为,加上公共品供给本身的特性,导致机制约束的必然性。为了解决这些问题,从信息传导和激励两个方面构建其约束机制,机制包含着种种必然的制度安排。
There exists dual princial-agent relationship as for government depositing resource, which may cause opportunism. In addition, the supply of public goods has special charactristic. Both must be restricted by mechanism.To solve these problems,it is necessary to build the efficient mechanism on how to deliver information and how to inspire officers,thus some institution arrangement is produced.
出处
《哈尔滨商业大学学报(社会科学版)》
2002年第3期77-79,共3页
Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition
关键词
委托代理
共容利益
逆向选择
道德风险
principal-agent problem
incentive-compatibility
adverse selection
moral hazard