欧盟银行“自救”机制中债权保障的失衡与应对

Credit Protection under the EU Bail-in Regime and China's Reply

欧盟《银行与风险处置条例》赋予成员国强制减记银行债务或债转股的"自救"权力,债权成为自救机制发挥作用的基础。风险处置目标的公共利益属性赋予了"自救"机制处分债权的正当性,但各目标存在冲突且优先次序不明,埋下了债权保障失衡的隐患。"自救"机制虽然"改良"破产清算程序要素,规定了"自救"机制的触发条件、合格债务及其最低标准、债务处置顺序、"不低于破产待遇"及其例外,但存在较大的裁量性。欧盟"自救"机制难以适用于"第三国文件"项下的合格债务,削弱了风险处置的效果,为"第三国"应对"自救"措施提供了空间。我国目前不宜承认和执行欧盟的自救措施,可在全球金融治理层面主张约束"自救"权力的行使,并在今后立法中有限采纳自救机制。

EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive grants member states＇ resolution authorities the administrative power to write down bank liabilities and/or convert them into the banks shares, which enable credit the fundamental basis of the bail-in function. The public interest nature of bank risk resolution goal endows the bail-in mechanism with the legitimacy of disposing the credit. However, there are no clear sequences among the conflicted resolution goals of EU bank risk resolution, burying the hidden danger of credit protection imbalance. The bail-in mechanism improves the elements of bankruptcy liquidation procedure, and makes provisions for trigger conditions, qualified liabilities and their minimum standards, the sequence o~ debt disposal, and ＂no less than bankruptcy treatment＂ ＆ their exceptions, but there is great discretion. EU bail- in mechanism is not applicable for qualified liabilities under the item of third party documents, weakens the effectiveness of risk resolution, and leaves space for a reply to bail-in measures in a third country. It is inappropriate for China in practice to recognize and enforce EU bail-in measures under the BRRD. China may insist to discipline the bail-in power at the global finance governance level and may finitely legislate the bail-in regime.