在“先验”与“经验”之间——从胡塞尔的“生活世界”到哈贝马斯的“生活世界”

Between“Transcendence ”and“Experience”——From Husserl's“Life World”to Habermas' “Life World”

胡塞尔"生活世界"理论的目的在于超越传统西方哲学,为哲学寻求到一个根本的前提,从而也为走出时代的困境给予解答。但是受传统主体性哲学的羁绊,胡塞尔未能拉紧"生活世界"的"先验"和"经验"维度,理论本身具有不彻底性。通过引入"语用学",哈贝马斯对胡塞尔的"生活世界"理论进行了改造,从而突破了胡塞尔的单主体性,进入到主体间性,"经验世界"和"先验世界"统一于主体间的话语实践中。

Husserl＇ s theory of ＂life world＂ aims at transcending the traditional western philosophy to seek a fundamental premise for philosophy and find a solution to the plight of the times. However, Husserl cannot link up the dimensions of ＂transcendence ＂ and ＂experience＂ in life world restricted by the traditional subjective philosophy, therefore, his theory is incomplete in itself. Habermas has renovated Husserl＇ s theory of ＂life world＂ through introducing ＂pragmatics＂ so that he breaks through Husserl＇ s single subjectivity into inter-subjectivity in which ＂empirical world＂ and ＂transcendental world＂ are united in the inter-subjective discourse practice.