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基于全支付拍卖模式的投标人竞价策略研究 被引量:1

Research on bidding strategy of bidders based on full payment auction model
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摘要 随着博弈论的出现和广泛应用,拍卖理论得到了深远的发展,其地位越来越重要.因此,拍卖理论及其应用是值得深入研究的问题.在基准模型的假定下,利用不完全信息静态博弈的方法,分别研究了全支付拍卖中基于固定投标人数的投标人竞价策略以及基于随机投标人数的投标人竞价策略,得出了两种情况下投标人的最优报价以及拍卖商的期望收益,并给出了相应的算例.解决了实际中难以确定投标人数的困难,能够更好地符合实际情况,为投标人做决策提供了相应的理论依据. With the emergence and wide application of game theory, auction theory has made great progress ; its status becomes more and more important. Therefore, auction theory and its application are worth researching deeply. Under the assumption of the benchmark model, using the method of the static game with incomplete information, the bidding strategy based on the fixed num- ber of bidders,and bidding strategy based on the random number of bidders in full payment auction were studied. The optimal bid of the bidder and the expected revenue of the auctioneer in these two cases were obtained, and the corresponding numerical examples were given. This method solves the difficulty in determining the number of bidders; it better conforms to the actual situ- ation;it provides the corresponding theoretical basis for the decisions of the bidders.
出处 《西南民族大学学报(自然科学版)》 CAS 2017年第5期532-537,共6页 Journal of Southwest Minzu University(Natural Science Edition)
基金 四川省软科学研究计划项目(2013ZR0002)
关键词 投标人 全支付拍卖 最优报价 投标人数 期望收益 bidder full payment auction optimal bid number of bidders expected revenue
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