基于序贯拍卖的最优折扣机制设计

Optimal discount mechanism based on sequential auctions

将数量折扣引入到具有多个买家与两件替代品的序贯二价拍卖中,利用数量折扣削弱物品之间的替代性,引发买家之间更为激烈的竞争,使卖家借此获益.得到了买家的均衡报价策略,针对不同买家数量的情形分别建立了确定最优折扣额度的数学模型.算例分析表明:采用适当的数量折扣可以增加卖家的事前期望收益;在买家人数较少,物品之间替代性较强,买家实力较强时,需要采用较大的折扣力度.

Quantity discount is introduced into the sequential second-price auctions with more than two buyers and two substitutes. Thus the substitutability is weakened between two objects, much more fierce competition is resulted among the buyers, and the seller benefits from this. The buyers＇ equilibrium bidding strategies are derived and a mathematical model is set up to determine the optimal discount for different numbers of buyers. Case analysis shows that： adopting moderate quantity discount can increase the seller＇s ex ante expected revenue; when there are less buyers, substitutability between two objects is stronger and buyers are more likely to be powerful, adopting a larger quantity discount is necessary.