考虑广告效应和信息共享的双渠道供应链分析

Analysis of a dual-channel supply chain with advertising effect and information sharing

本文研究在网络渠道和实体商店零售渠道的广告效应下,处于信息不对称地位的制造商与零售商之间考虑进行信息共享策略.通过建立Stackelberg博弈模型及合作博弈模型,求解需求不确定性下制造商和零售商的最优策略.不同的数值实验表明当制造商对于市场的预期较低时,实体商店零售渠道广告影响越弱,零售商进行信息共享后的利润损失越小,会愿意进行信息共享,提升整个双渠道供应链的总利润.最后,将双渠道的广告效应延伸到现实的批发价格激励机制之中,表明该激励机制使制造商和零售商的利润高于非信息共享的情况.

This paper studies the information sharing strategy between a manufacturer and a retailer in asymmetric positions with advertisement effect in both Internet channel and retail channel. Then the manufacturer＇s optimal profit and the retailer＇s optimal profit under demand uncertainty are solved by Stackelberg game model and cooperative game model. Numerical experiments show that when the manufacturer＇s expectation is low,the loss of the retailer＇s profit becomes smaller as the advertisement effect in the retail channel weakens, and the retailer would like to share the information to increase total profit in the supply chain. Extending this effect into an incentive mechanism in a reality market case proves this incentive mechanism can improve the manufacturer＇s profit and retailer＇s profit compared with the no information sharing case.