摘要
近年来移动互联网带动了跨境电商的迅猛发展。那么,研究跨境电商平台如何进行产品价格博弈才能获得效益最大化,这一问题具有现实意义。本文用伯川德模型理论和数值模拟的方法对双寡头跨境电商APP平台产品价格博弈进行分析。分析了根据上一期的价格,下一期的价格和价格调整速率、跨境电商APP平台爆款产品的替代率、产品的爆款程度对另一平台的溢出效应等因素的关系得出:跨境电商APP平台产品价格的调整速度不能过快;平台可以主打爆款产品增加效益,同时对价格的调整拥有更大的灵活性;平台引入的爆款产品的溢出效应对平台的收益也有一定的影响。由此给跨境电商平台管理者决策提供依据,从而避免市场陷入无序的竞争。
In recent years the development of mobile Internet led to the rapid devel- opment of cross-border electricity. It is important practical significance that how to choose a product of price game to get maximum benefit about cross-border electric busi- ness platform. We analyz the price game of the dual-oligarch cross-border e-commerce APP platform by Bertrand model theory and the method of numerical simulation. According to the previous price, the price of the next is relate to cross-border electricity price adjust- ment rate,APP platform hot style product replacement rate,degree of hot style of the product to another platform of spillover effects of factors. It is concluded that: The price adjustment speed cannot too fast of Cross-border electrical contractor APP plat- form;Platform can main hot style product to increase efficiency, it also has greater flex- ibility to adjust prices at the same time;Spillover that Platform to introduce the hot style products has a certain influence on the platform of earnings. It can give platform management some advice through the above analysis to avoid disorderly competition.
出处
《价格理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第6期152-155,共4页
Price:Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目"不完全信息模式广义马尔科夫跳跃系统的微分博弈理论及应用"(7157010535)
高水平大学建设项目:"基于不完全信息广义线性马尔科夫跳跃系统微分博弈模型的资本外流分析"(262523691)
"DC型企业年金最优资产配置和给付方案的微分博弈模型研究(50010102)"
广东省教育厅普通高校特色创新类项目:"委托投资组合管理中的激励合约设计:基于风险约束视角"(2015WTSCX014)
关键词
跨境电商APP
价格竞争
伯川德模型
纳什均衡
Cross-border Electricity APP
Price Competition
Bertrand model
Chaos
Nash e-quilibrium