分析师跟进、公司性质与盈余管理——基于应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理

Analyst Following,Company Nature and Earnings Management

本文以2012-2015中国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,采用异常操控性项目的计算方法衡量企业应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理水平,考察分析师对管理层应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理程度的影响。研究发现:分析师跟进对真实盈余管理具有抑制作用,对应计盈余管理具有促进作用,其促进作用对管理层正向盈余更为敏感,即应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理之间发生了替代效应;相对于国有企业,分析师跟进对非国有企业真实盈余管理抑制作用更为明显;研究结论以期为完善分析师的外部治理职能提供理论支持和经验数据。

Taking the A-stock listed companies of China in 2012-2015 as the objects of research samples and using the calculation method of abnormal maneuverability measure the level of enterprise’s accrued earnings management and real earnings management,this paper attempts to study whether the listed companies will make accrual earnings management or real earnings management under the influence of the earnings forecasts made by securities analysts.The result of the study indicates that analysts following have negative effect on real earnings management.However,it promoting listed companies real earnings management and its promoting effect is more sensitive on positive accrual earnings management;this means accrual earnings management and real earnings management have substitution effects.Comparing with state-owned enterprises,the analysts following’s negative impact on non-state-owned enterprises’real earnings management is more obvious.The conclusion is to provide theoretical support and empirical data for government to improve the external governance functions of analysts.