政府补助、高管外部薪酬差距与企业业绩

Government Subsidy, External Executive Compensation Gap and the Performance of Enterprises

从政府补助这一外生变量入手,以2007-2015年中国A股亏损和非亏损公司的数据为样本,首次检验了政府补助与高管外部薪酬差距的关系。研究发现,政府补助与高管外部薪酬差距之间的关系因企业盈利状况不同而存在不同机理,不能一概而论。(1)对于非亏损企业,企业获得的政府补助与高管外部薪酬差距正相关,且政府补助导致的这部分增加的差距抑制了对企业业绩的促进作用,证实了政府补助助长了非亏损企业的高管外部薪酬差距。而剔除政府补助影响的高管外部薪酬差距仍与绩效正相关。(2)亏损企业获得的政府补助与高管外部薪酬差距无显著关系。本文的研究避免了高管与员工不对等产生的薪酬差距比较偏误,丰富了政府补助在不同盈利状况企业作用效果的研究,为相关部门制定企业高管薪酬结构相关政策提供了理论和经验证据。

With the substantial increase in the amount of government subsidies in recent years, scholars and the community had been more concerned about the effectiveness of government subsidies. This article takes the government grants of 2007-2015 Chinese A shares＇ losses and non-loss data as the sample, and test the relationship between government subsidies and the executive compensation gap and its economic consequences for the first time. We found： （1） the relationship between government subsidies and external executive pay gap differentiate due to the financial situation of enterprises. In the non-loss enterprises, executives will use their own power to disguise the government subsidies as their own performance, thereby increasing executive compensation, and then expand the external executive compensation gap. Therefore, for the non-loss enterprises, the government subsidies received by the enterprises are positively related to the external compensation gap. Government subsidies will be used to take around, so there is no significant relationship between the government subsidy and the external compensation gap. （2）further analysis shows that, for the non-loss enterprises, the increase of the external compensation gap caused by government subsidies will inhibit the promotion of executive compensation gap on the performance of enterprises.