政策模糊与治理绩效:基于对政府间分权化改革的观察

Policy Ambiguity and Governance Performance: Based on the Observation of Intergovernmental Decentralization Reform

政策模糊是指决策者有意用含糊的、不太确定的形式表达政策目标,以增加应变能力。这种政策现象被学术界广泛诟病但又大量存在于中国的公共管理实践之中。本文以分权化改革为观察对象,梳理政策模糊与治理绩效的相关性。研究发现,分权化改革的政策模糊是单一制国家的公共权力自上而下配置与公共服务自下而上需求之间平衡后的无奈选择,目的在于保证中央意志的执行与地方治理主动性的统一。良好的政策效果使得双方受益,政策效果差时也会自动实现社会风险向地方转移,不会影响政治稳定这一国家治理终极目标的实现。但是,从长期来看,须实现治理有效性向治理正当性转变,这就要求政策模糊程度必须根据权力配置与政治稳定的关系进行灵活抉择。

Policy ambiguity refers to the decision makers express policy objectives in a vague and less certain form on purpose in order to increase resilience. This policy phenomenon has been widely criticized by the academic community but exists in China＇s public management practice. In this paper, we take the reform of decentralization as the object of observation, combing the relationship between policy ambiguity and governance performance. The study found that the policy ambiguity of decentralization reform is a helpless choice for the balance between the top-down configuration of public power and the bottom-up demand of public services in unitary government type, with the aim of ensuring the implementation of central government will and the protection of local governance initiative. Good policy effect benefits the two sides of the central and local government. Even the poor policy effect will automatically achieve social risks moving to the local government, which will not affect the political stability of the country, and finally achieve the ultimate goal of governance. However, in the long run, it is necessary to realize the transformation from governance effectiveness to the legitimacy of governance, which requires that the degree of policy ambiguity must be flexibly based on the relationship between power allocation and political stability.