基于改进CPT的矿工HVB变化分析

Improved CPT based analysis of change in miners' HVB

为探究矿工习惯性违章行为(HVB)的变化路径,从演化博弈的角度,基于改进的累积前景理论(CPT),构建矿工与安全监管人员间的收益感知矩阵;在综合考虑双方利益的基础上,引入薪酬激励作为变量,构建奖酬变动对矿工HVB变化的影响模型;以王庄煤矿为例,运用Matlab仿真软件模拟验证改进措施。结果表明:以改进的CPT为基础的演化博弈能有效探究矿工HVB的变化过程;只有当4个约束不等式同时被满足时,安全程度才能达到最高;在一定条件下,薪酬激励程度越高,矿工违章行为发生概率越低。提高薪酬水平和矿工风险感知能力有利于降低矿工HBV的发生概率,提升煤矿安全管理水平。

To explore the change of HVB,from the perspective of evolutionary game,using the improved CPT,a payment matrix was constructed for HVB miners and safety supervisors. By considering interests of both the sides and introducing incentive compensation as variables,a model was built for the influence of reward change on miners’ HVB transformation. Taking Wangzhuang coal mine as an example,the Matlab was used to verify the effectiveness of the measures. The results show that the evolutionary game based on improved CPT can effectively explore the process of change of miner HVB,that only when 4 constraint inequalities are met at the same time can the safety level reach the highest level,that under certain conditions,the higher the salary incentive degree is,the lower the probability of miners’ violation behavior will be,and that improving the risk perception ability and raising the salary level of miners are helpful to reduce the occurrence of miners’ HBV behavior and raise the safety management level of coal mine.