摘要
为改善供应链内中小企业的安全生产状况,剖析中小企业与其供应链内核心企业的委托-代理关系,并构建双任务委托-代理框架下的中小企业安全生产激励契约模型。结合数值仿真,分析模型中的激励参数、中小企业生产与安全任务努力水平及核心企业收益得出:核心企业对中小企业生产任务的激励明显大于对安全任务的激励;核心企业帮助中小企业降低其安全成本或增加其安全边际收益,必将在更大程度上提高其安全任务努力水平;核心企业援助链上中小企业,使其降低生产及安全成本,也有利于核心企业自身。
To improve the situation of work safety of small and medium-sized enterprises in China,the principal-agent relationships between the enterprises and core enterprises in supply chain were analyzed and an incentive contract model was built for safety of small and medium-sized enterprises under the dual task principal-agent framework condition. Incentive parameters,the effort level of small and medium enterprise production and safety tasks and the return of core enterprise were analyzed by using a numerical simulation method. The results show that the incentive of the core enterprise to the production tasks of small and medium-sized enterprises is obviously greater than that to the safety tasks that reducing the safety costs of small and medium-sized enterprises or increasing their safety marginal revenue with core enterprise’s help will increase their effort to a greater extent in performing the safety task,and that if a core enterprise helps the small and medium-sized enterprises to reduce their production and safety costs,the core enterprise’s own income will increase.
作者
周巧梅
梅强
刘素霞
ZHOU Qiaomei MEI Qiang LIU Suxia(School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang Jiangsu 212013, China)
出处
《中国安全科学学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第7期145-150,共6页
China Safety Science Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金资助(71373104
71403108)
关键词
安全生产
双任务委托-代理
激励契约
供应链
中小企业
work safety
dual task principal-agent
incentive contract
supply chain
small and medium-sized enterprise