随机惩罚下电子废弃物回收主体间的演化博弈

Evolutionary Game between Irregular Recycling Groups and Regular Recycling Enterprises of Electronic Waste under Random Punishment

本文从博弈的视角出发,对政府的奖惩机制下非正规回收群体与正规回收企业间合作行为的演变途径进行了研究,研究结果表明,该系统的演化方向与博弈的支付矩阵以及博弈发生时的初始状态是密不可分的,其中政府的补贴和随机惩罚、双方选择合作所获得的超额收益,合作成本以及合作风险损失是影响博弈双方合作策略选择的关键变量。最后以此为基础,提出了促使非正规回收商与正规回收企业达成良好合作关系的政策建议。

This paper studies the evolution of the cooperative behavior between the irregular recycling group and the regular recycling enterprise from the perspective of the game under the government incentive mechanism. The results show that the evolution direction of the system,the payment matrix of the game and the initial state of the game are all inseparable,among which the government allowance and its random punishment,the excess earnings obtained by the way of cooperation chosen by the two parties,the cooperation costs and the cooperative risk loss are the key variables affecting the choice of the game strategy of cooperation between the two. Finally,it put forward some policy suggestions for promoting the irregular recycling group and the regular recycling enterprises to achieve a good cooperative relationship.