多个大股东能否降低公司债务融资成本

Do Multiple Blockholders Reduce the Cost of Debt Financing?

本文以2003-2014年的中国上市公司为样本,检验了多个大股东对公司债务融资成本的影响。结果表明,具有多个大股东的公司债务融资成本更低。该结论在控制内生性后依然成立。我们发现与监督假说一致,当公司内大股东数量越多、非控股大股东持股越多、大股东间持股分散度越低时,大股东更容易发挥监督作用,公司的债务融资成本越低。此外,当公司信息环境更好、公司所处地区法律环境更好时,大股东更容易发挥监督作用,多个大股东与债务融资成本间的负向关系也更加明显。本文从债务融资成本视角,为股权结构安排的经济后果提供了一定的证据支持。

Using the sample of Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2014, this paper empirically tests the effect of multiple blockholders on the cost of debt. Results show that firms with multiple blockholders are associated with lower cost of debt, indicating a monitoring role of multiple blockholders. The conclusion still holds after taking endogeneity issue into consideration. We also find that the cost of debt decreases with the number of blockholders and the power of non-control blockholders, while it increases with the dispersion of blockholders. Furthermore, the monitoring effect of multiple bloekholders on cost of debt is more pro- nounced in firms with better information environment or headquartered in areas with better legal environ- ment. The paper explores the economic consequences of ownership structure from a view of cost of debt.