认知态度的内容:命题论与属性论辨析

The Content of Cognitive Attitudes: The Debate between Propositionalism and the Property Theory

信念等认知态度通常被认为是主体与命题间的一种关系,并且它们的内容也被认为是具有真假值的命题。但是这种观念却无法为从己信念的内容找到恰当的命题。而对"行为解释论证"和"两个上帝论证"的重构,可以说明从己信念问题的解决需要我们放弃关于信念等认知态度的主导观念——命题教条,即信念是主体与具有真假值的命题之间的关系,转而主张属性论,即信念是主体与自我归属的属性之间的关系。在考察了命题主义者对"两个上帝论证"及属性论的主要反驳后,就更有理由坚持属性论。

Belief and other cognitive attitudes are usually considered as relations between subjects and propositions,and the contents of these attitudes are always considered as propositions with true or false value.However,this view cannot identify the appropriate proposition as the content of belief de se. On reconstructing the argument of explanation of behavior and the two gods argument,it is argued that the resolution of problem of belief de se requires us to refute the doctrine of propositions in the notion of belief and other cognitive attitudes,and maintain that belief is the relation between subjects and the properties self-ascribed. By reviewing the major arguments from the propositionalists against the two gods argument and property theory,it is the property theory that we should insist on to characterize the cognitive attitudes.