第三方监督视角下财政科技经费监管演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Science and Technology Fund Regulation from the Perspective of Third-party Intendance

基于演化博弈理论,将第三方监督纳入财政科技经费监管分析框架,构建该条件下财政科技经费监管者与使用者行为策略选择的博弈模型,探讨第三方监督力度大小的差异对科技经费使用者和监管者的策略选择影响机理。研究发现,第三方监督与科技经费监管者的监督之间存在着替代关系,第三方监督力度的增大既有利于科技经费监管者倾向选择严格监管策略,也有助于科技经费使用者选择合法合规使用经费策略。在此基础上,为更有效地加强财政科技经费监管提出建议。

Based on the theory of evolutionary game,the third-party intendance is included in the framework of financial science and technology fund regulation and analysis in this paper. And this study constructs the game model of financial science and technology fund regulators and user behavior strategy selection and discusses the mechanismthat the impact of the differenceof third-party intendance＇sstrength on the strategy choice of the users and regulators of the science and technology fund. The study finds that there is an alternative relationship between the supervision of third-party intendance and the regulation of regulator. The increase in third-party intendance＇s strength is conducive to the fact that regulators of science and technology fund tend to choose strategies to strictly regulate and also help users to choose strategies to exploitfunds with laws and compliance. On this basis,this study puts forwardrecommendationsfor more effectivelystrengthening the financial science and technology fund regulation.