政治关联、竞争地位与混合并购——来自中国A股证券市场的经验证据

Political Connection,Competitive Position and Conglomerate Merger—A Study based on China's A-share Securities Market

从中国转轨经济时期特殊的制度背景与企业竞争态势的视角出发,以2007—2011年间中国A股证券市场上发生的522起并购事件为样本,运用Logistic回归方法与中介效应模型分别考察了企业政治关联与竞争地位对混合并购决策及其绩效的共同影响。研究发现:混合并购总体上难以为并购方创造长期的价值,而且其并购绩效要显著低于相关并购;在并购前,企业的政治关联度与竞争地位分别与其混合并购倾向显著正相关、负相关;越是竞争劣势企业,越倾向于利用自身政治关联身份实施混合并购行为。在并购后,政治关联能够帮助企业提高混合并购绩效,并且这一绩效提升路径是通过并购后企业竞争地位的改善得以顺利实现。

Using a sample of 522 merger events which occurred in Chinese A-share securities market from 2007 to 2011 ,we first empirically investigate the influences of enterprise political connection and competitive position on conglomerate merger decision by logistic regression, and further explore the mediating effect of the change of merging firm＇s competitive position on the relationship between political connection and corporate performance after conglomerate merger. The results indicate that：In contrast with related mergers,conglomerate mergers could hardly create value for shareholders. In the pre merger period,political connection is significantly positive correlated with conglomerate merger decision ,and enterprise competitive position is negative correlated with conglomerate merger strategy. Further more, the worse corporate competition status is, the more likely political connection would lead to conglomerate merger. In the post conglomerate merger period,there exists a significantly positive relationship between political connection and post-merger performance,among which the promotion of merging firm＇s competitive position plays an important mediating effect. That is ,conglomerate merger＇s political connection can firstly help improve its competitive status ,which finally enhances its post-merger performance：