创业投资家:偷懒耍滑抑或勤勉尽责?——基于静态博弈和动态博弈的分析

Venture Capitalists:Goof-off or Being Diligence?——Based on the Analysis of Static Game and Dynamic Game

创业投资作为一种支持创新创业的"集合投资制度",创业投资家是否会利用其私有信息实施有损投资者利益的行为,若发生应如何有效抑制这种机会主义行为。文章基于信息对称和信息不对称两种情形,分别构造一个单期静态与一个多期动态博弈模型,比较不同情境下纳什均衡时双方的策略选择。研究发现,利益冲突、信息不对称和契约不完备是诱发创业投资家机会主义行为的罪魁祸首,而有效的显性激励和隐性激励机制则是缓解创业投资家道德风险的良方妙药。结果表明,提高创业投资家偷懒的临界收益和增加创业投资者监督的临界成本,能够促使创业投资家勤勉尽责工作,抑制其偷懒耍滑行为,并认为采取有限合伙制组织形式和建立声誉机制,能够达到显性激励与隐性激励相得益彰的效果。

As a kind of＂collective investment system＂for supporting innovation and entrepreneurship, whether venture capitalists willuse their private information to impose acts that are detrimental to the interests of venture investors and how to effectively curb their oppor-tunistic behavior. Based on the situations of symmetric and asymmetric information, this paper aims to compare the strategy choice of bothsides under different situations by constructing a single stage static game model and a multi-stage dynamic game model respectively,when Nash equilibrium is achieving. The paper finds that a conflict of interest, information asymmetry and incomplete contract are thechief culprits of inducing opportunism behavior of venture capitalists. And the effective mechanism of explicit and implicit incentives isgood way to alleviate the moral hazard of venture capitalists. The results show that enhancing the critical yield of venture capitalists＇ lazi-ness and increasing the critical cost of venture investors＇ supervision can encourage venture capitalists to work diligently, and restraintheir goof-off. The paper suggests that adopting the limited partnership and building the reputation mechanism can achieve the effect of ex-plicit and implicit incentives to complement each other.