摘要
基于公司外部治理机制的视角,检验了资本市场的卖空压力对国有企业创新产出的影响。以历次融资融券扩容为政策冲击,采用多时点双重差分模型,验证了卖空与国有企业创新产出的关系。结果显示:加入融资融券标的后,国有上市公司的专利申请量相比民营上市公司有显著增长;卖空对国有企业创新产出的激励作用在市场化程度较低的地区以及地方国有企业上更为显著。
This paper examines the real effect of short selling on the innovation output of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)from the perspective of external governance mechanism.Using the multi-period difference-in-differences approach,it explores a quasi-natural experiment in China,and compares the patent applications of SOEs and non-SOEs after they are added to the short selling list by China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC).The result shows that short selling has a positive casual effect on SOEs' innovation output,and the positive effect is more pronounced in provinces with lower marketization level and for local state-owned enterprises.
出处
《技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第9期58-67,共10页
Journal of Technology Economics
基金
清华大学自主科研计划青年专项"金融支持
万众创新与中国梦的实现"(20151080451)资助
关键词
卖空
国有企业
创新产出
short selling
state-owned enterprise
innovation output