政府双重干预对双销售渠道闭环供应链的影响

Impacts of government double intervention on dual-sale-channel closed-loop supply chain

本文考虑政府再造品置换补贴和废旧品回收奖惩双重干预(简称政府双重干预),分别构建了无政府干预、再造品置换补贴干预、废旧品回收奖惩干预和政府双重干预下的双销售渠道闭环供应链模型.在政府干预内生化的基础上,探讨了政府双重干预对闭环供应链最优决策的影响并与单一政策的干预效果进行对比分析,并以社会福利最大化为目标分析了政府的最优干预参数.研究表明:政府双重干预下,新产品价格和需求量会降低,再造品价格和需求量会上升;政府双重干预时,两政策的干预效果会叠加,强化了单一政策干预的效果,进一步促进再造品的销售和废旧品的回收;通过设计合理的干预力度和干涉阈值,可提高制造商利润和消费者剩余并实现全社会福利的增加;制造商与零售商通过利润共享,可弥补政策干预下的零售商利润损失,保证闭环供应链的稳定性和实现闭环供应链成员的共赢.

Considering that the government implemented remanufactured product replacement subsidy intervention and recycling amount bonus-penalty intervention simultaneously, this paper constructed four different dual-sale-channel closed-loop supply chain models, namely, without government intervention, with remanufactured product replacement subsidy intervention, with recycling amount bonus-penalty interven- tion and with government double intervention. On the basis of endogenous government intervention, the effect of government double intervention on closed-loop supply chain decision was discussed and compared with government single intervention. At the same time, we quantified the government optimal decision on the basis of social welfare maximization. The results showed that： under the government double intervention, the sale price and the market demand of the new products would decline, and the sale price and the market demand of the remanufactured products would rise; When the government implemented double interventions, the intervention effect of the two policies would be superimposed, which would further promote the sales of remanufactured products and recycling of waste products; By designing a reasonable interference threshold, the government can improve the profits of manufacturer and consumer surplus and enhance the social welfare; By sharing profits, manufacturer and retailer can compensate for the loss of retailer profits, guarantee the stability of supply chain and achieve a win-win situation of supply chain members.