摘要
科学仪器在科学知识的产生过程中起到基础性作用。那么,它们可以被视为我们观察大自然的窗口吗?以显微镜的使用为例,科学实在论与建构经验论关于科学仪器作用的争论可以从下述三个方面加以系统地梳理:(1)通过显微镜是否看见微观结构,(2)显微镜影像是否表征微观结构,以及(3)独立知觉是否优于辅助知觉。对建构经验论的进一步考察表明,范·弗拉森关于可观察性的主张不仅在认识论上得不到辩护,而且也严重脱离了科学实践。根据延展认知系统观念,科学家的知觉过程有时可以跨越其原初生物学边界而延展至环境,整合与之紧密耦合的外部仪器手段。该进路给予我们理解科学仪器窗口隐喻的一种崭新视角,但同时也面临一些问题。
Scientific instruments play a fundamental role in the generation of scientific knowledge. Can they then be regarded as windows for observing nature? In the case of the use of microscopes,for example,the latest debates between scientific realism and constructive empiricism regarding scientific instruments can systematically broken down into the following three issues:( 1) whether microstructures might be seen through microscopes,( 2) whether microscopic images represent microstructures,and( 3) whether unaided perception is superior to aided perception. A further examination of constructive empiricism shows that van Fraassen's claim about observability seriously deviates from scientific practice,and is also epistemologically unjustified.According to the concept of the extended cognitive system,a scientist's perceptual process can sometimes extend beyond his/her original biological boundaries into the environment,incorporating external instruments with which he/she is intimately coupled. Despite facing some problems,this approach gives us a new perspective on the window metaphor for scientific instruments.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第10期111-119,共9页
Philosophical Research
基金
国家社科基金重大项目"认知科学对当代哲学的挑战"(编号11&ZD187)
中国博士后科学基金面上项目"从延展认知系统观念看科学仪器介入科学表征"(编号2017M612689)的阶段性成果