地方官员任期、晋升锦标赛与五星级酒店行业发展

Local Officials' Tenure,Promotion Tournament and Chinese Five-star Hotels Industry Development

笔者以年份2000—2014期间中国省际五星级酒店的面板数据为样本,立足于微观层面的政府官员视角,涵盖五星级酒店数量与收入双重维度,采用实证研究方法,探究地方官员任期、晋升锦标赛对五星级酒店行业发展的影响,并将研究视角延伸至政府反腐政策、官员更替背景下晋升压力对五星级酒店收入影响的可持续性。研究发现,任期较短的官员倾向于投建国有、外商五星级酒店,但短期任期驱动下的五星级酒店"扩建热"并未提升五星级酒店的收入水平。晋升锦标赛导致国有、私营五星级酒店的数量扩张,并因官员的政绩诉求推动了五星级酒店的收入增长;在高压反腐以及官员更替时期,晋升压力对五星级酒店收入的提振效应弱化,呈现出收入增长的不可持续性。研究结果表明,五星级酒店的不合理投建、短视行为以及不同所有制酒店的不公平竞争等问题的解决须重视官员经济行为中的道德风险。本研究成果验证了任期对官员经济行为影响的存在性,为多情景视角下晋升锦标赛的持续影响增添了中观层面的经验证据。

Based on the panel data of provincial five-star hotels from 2000 to 2014, from the perspective of local officials, this paper makes the empirical analysis of the influences of officials＇ tenure and the promotion tournament on the development of five-star hotels including the number and income level. Furthermore, this paper studies the persistence effects of the promotion pressure on five-star hotels＇ revenue from the aspects of government incorruption and official turnover. The results indicate that local officials with short tenure tend to fasten the construction step of state-owned and foreign five-star hotels for greater political performance while have no significantly influence on the five-star hotels revenue, especially for guest-room revenue. The promotion tournament is found to promote the quantitative development of state-owned and private five-star hotels. Meanwhile, local officials＇ thirst of greater political performance contributes significantly to the five-star revenue increase. However, the promotion effect on the five-star hotels revenue provided by promotion pressure is inconsistent with growing government incorruption and officials＇ turnover. Hence, it is necessary to emphasize the moral hazard during the governing process of local officials in order to prevent the occurrence of unreasonable construction, short-view act for revenue increase and unfair competition of five-star hotels among different ownership influenced by local officials＇ different motives. This study verifies the existence of the influence of tenure on officials＇ economic activities, and provides empirical evidence about the continuous influence of promotion tournament from the perspective of multi scenarios in the level of industry.