城市间环境治理耦合协同演化仿真

Coupling and coordinating simulation of environmental governance between cities

环境治理工作涉及到各地政府的耦合协同,基于利益主体协同演化的视角,分别构建了无约束机制和中央政府约束机制下地方政府间对环境治理选择策略的演化博弈模型,以此分析了各级政府在环境治理工作中所扮演的角色,同时借助复制动态方程得到了利益相关方的演化稳定策略,并进一步应用MATLAB仿真工具进行了仿真模拟。结果显示:在无约束状态下,博弈系统难以依靠地方政府的自觉性演化到理想状态,只有当政府的净收益大于0时,才会主动进行环境治理;引入中央政府的约束机制后,通过对地方政府加以奖惩干预,可以加快其向理想状态演化。

The environmental governance work involves governments coupled together. Therefore,based on the perspective of stakeholders co-evolution,this essay constructs the evolutionary game model of the choice of environmental governance among the local governments under the unconstrained mechanism and central government restraint mechanism,so as to explore the roles of governments at all levels in environmental governance,and obtain the stabilization strategies of the stakeholders by means of the replication dynamic equation,and to further simulate the simulation using MATLAB simulation tools. The results show that in the unconstrained state,the game system is difficult to catch the ideal state,relying on the local government＇s consciousness. Only when the net income is greater than 0,the governments will take measures to cope with the environmental problems. After the introduction of constraint mechanism of the central government,the ideal state of local governments speeds up,which run in the way that puts reward and punishment intervention to the governments.