委托代理理论下的“重科研轻教学”现象研究

Study on the Phenomenon of“Emphasizing Research and Ignoring Teaching”Based on Principal-agent Theory

通过多任务委托代理模型分析高校职称评定与业绩奖励机制对教师教学科研活动的影响,从委托代理理论角度解释"重科研轻教学"现象的成因,探讨高校业绩奖励政策与职称评定政策之间的关系,建议:高校业绩奖励政策与职称评定政策需要合理配合,两种激励机制应该呈反向替代关系。

This paper analyzes the impact of professional title evaluation and performance reward mechanism in university on teachers＇ teaching and research activities through multi task principal-agent model.It also explains the causes of the phenomenon of ＂Emphasizing Research and Ignoring Teaching＂, and probes into the relationship between the performance reward peliey and the professional title evaluation peliey of universities from the perspective of principal-agent theory. It is suggested that the university performance reward policy and the professional rifle evaluation policy should be reasonably enordinated, and the two incentive mechanisms should be reverse substitutes.