利益相关者、公司治理与盈余管理:基于文献的研究

Stakeholders,External Governance and Earnings Management: Research based on Literature

公司治理理论自股东治理观逐渐发展到利益相关者共同治理观以来,利益相关者能否有效发挥治理作用一直是被广泛研究的问题。本文从盈余管理的视角切入,利用文献研究法,通过考察利益相关者能否对高管盈余管理行为形成制约来探讨其公司治理作用。梳理相关文献发现,分析师、机构投资者、媒体、审计师和供应商/客户等利益相关者对高管盈余管理行为发挥着重要的治理作用,其治理效果可概括为监督效应、压力效应、替代效应;利益相关者与公司利益关联的性质、程度与作用渠道的不同,其公司治理效果存在显著差异;利益相关者治理效果存在替代效应,其异质性和公司特征、内部治理机制、外部环境都会影响各主体的成本和收益,最终影响公司治理效果。因此,应从强化内部治理机制和改善外部环境两个方面改善利益相关者公司治理效果,以最大化地发挥其监督效应并减少压力效应带来的机会主义行为。

Since corporate governance theory has gradually evolved from shareholder governance to stakeholder governance,it has been a question of concern whether stakeholders can effectively play the role of governance. From the point of view of earnings management,this paper explores the external governance role of stakeholders through the analysis of whether stakeholders can mitigate the earnings management behavior of executives with literature research method.Through studying relevant literature,the paper finds that analysts,institutional investors,media,auditors,and suppliers/customers,etc. stakeholders have important government effects on executives＇ earnings management behavior,whose governance effects can be summarized as supervision effect,pressure effect and substitution effect; there is a significant difference in the corporate governance effect because of the difference in the nature,degree and function channels between stakeholders and corporate interests; the governance effect of stakeholder has the substitution effect,and its heterogeneity,corporate characteristics,internal governance mechanism and external environment can affect the cost and income of each subject,and eventually affect the corporate governance effect. Therefore,we should improve corporate governance effect of stakeholders from two aspects of strengthening internal governance mechanism and improving external environment,to maximize the effect of supervision and reduce opportunistic behavior brought by pressure effect.