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从“深奥哲学”到“简易哲学”’:休谟对理性形而上学的解构 被引量:1

From “Abstruse Philosophy”to“Simple Philosophy”:Hume's Deconstruction to Rational Metaphysics
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摘要 休谟竭力批判理性形而上学的哲学方法论,力求为哲学重新奠基。经验主义哲学方法对于解构理性形而上学的结构和体系具有毁灭性作用。休谟将一切观念最终都还原为印象,一切观念都可以从印象中寻找到初始根据。在休谟看来,印象优先于观念的原则普遍有效。精神世界的观念之间的相互吸引作用与自然世界的自然事物之间的作用具有相似性。与理性形而上学不同,休谟借助于人在经验和观察基础上养成的习惯界定一般观念或抽象观念,并借助于语言寻求一般性。在反驳笛卡尔自我观念的虚妄性基础上,休谟将自我观念严格地限定在经验与观察的印象基础之上加以阐明,即在原始知觉印象的基础上借助于经验和观察的方法对自我观念进行哲学辩论、辨正和改造。 Hume managed to criticize the philosophical methodology of rational metaphysics and strove to lay a new foundation forphilosophy.The method of empirical philosophyhas destructiveeffect on deconstructing the structure and system of rational metaphysics.Hume finally restored all ideas to impressions,and all ideas were able to find the initial bases from impressions.In Hume's view,the principle that impression is superior to idea has a universal validity.Hume believed that the effect of mutual attraction among the spiritual world's ideas is similar to the effect among natural things in the natural world.Unlike the rational metaphysics,Hume defined the general idea or abstract idea by means of the habits of human beings formed on the basis of experience and observation,while seeking generality with the aid of language.On the basis of rejecting the unreality of Cartesian self-concept,Humeilluminated the self-concept strictly on the basis of the impressions of experience and observation,that is to say,he was concentrated on doing philosophical debates,correction and transformation on self-concept on the basis of the original perceptions or impressions with the help of experience and observation.
作者 王腾
出处 《西南大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2017年第6期5-14,共10页 Journal of Southwest University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金 国家社会科学基金一般项目"英美情感主义伦理思想研究"(16BZX095)
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