制造商竞争情形下绿色产品生产策略研究

Production Strategy of Green Product under the Competition of Manufacturer

文章使用两阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,重点研究了两制造商竞争的情况下,产品的批发价格和制造商的绿色生产程度对供应链各参与主体利润的影响。在第一种情形下,两制造商被动实施绿色生产,只在批发价格上竞争,通过计算可以得到,两制造商的最优批发价格和最优零售价格均随消费者环保意识,制造商绿色生产程度的增大而增大,且绿色生产标准较低时,绿色生产程度低的制造商有竞争优势,绿色生产标准较高时,绿色生产程度高的制造商才有竞争优势;在第二种情形下,两制造商主动实施绿色生产策略,同时在批发价格和绿色生产程度两方面竞争,通过计算可以分别得到两制造商的最优批发价格和最优零售价格,均随消费者环保意识,制造商绿色生产程度的增大而增大,随与绿色生产相关成本的增大而减小,并且研究了两制造商绿色生产相关的成本差对各参与主体利润的影响。最后通过数值算例验证了文章的结论。

In this paper, the two-stage Staekelberg game model is used to focus on the influence of the wholesale price and the green production degree of the manufacturer on the profit of each participant in the supply chain. In the first case. the two man- ufacturers passively implement green production, compete only in the wholesale price. Both the optimal wholesale price and the optimal retail price increase as consumer environmental awareness or manufacturers green production increase. The low-level green production manufacturers have a competitive advantage when the green production standards are low, the high-level green pro- duction manufacturers have a competitive advantage when the green production standards are high. In the second case. the two manufacturers take the initiative to implement the green production strategy, compete both in the wholesale price and green pro- duction level. Both the optimal wholesale price and the optimal retail price increase as consumer environmental awareness or manufacturers green production increase, decrease as the cost of green production increases. And the impact of the cost difference between the green production of the two manufacturers on the profit of each participant is studied. Finally, a numerical example is given to demonstrate the conclusion of this paper.