回收渠道竞争下的中国EPR制度设计研究

Design of EPR under recycling channel competition

基于我国正规回收渠道和非正规回收渠道竞争的现状,通过构造包含新产品生产阶段和废旧产品回收处理阶段的两阶段的博弈模型,并分析了不同的目标下EPR制度的设计问题.结果表明,当回收渠道之间的成本差较小时,两种目标下的最优合同是一致的,此时政府通过提高处置费来降低市场上的废旧电器量从而降低污染;反之,两种目标下EPR制度的设计不同,此时正规回收渠道的绝对处理量最大化目标全面占优正规回收渠道的相对处理量最大化目标.此外,还发现补贴对闭环供应链中的企业和消费者而言并不总是有利的.

Based on the status of the competition between the formal and informal channel,this paper formulates a two period game model containing the new product producing period and the used products recycling period to analyze the contract design of EPR under different objectives. The results indicate: when the cost difference between the two recyclers is small,the optimal contracts under the two objectives are the same,then the government improves the disposal fee to decrease the new product quantity in order to decrease the pollution; otherwise,the optimal contracts under two objectives are different. Maximizing the absolute recycling quantity of qualified recycler is dominant over maximizing the relative quantity of qualified recycler. Moreover,subsidies are not always beneficial to firms and consumers.