实践同一性——科尔斯戈德对康德道德哲学的推进

Practice Identity——Korsgaard's Promotion to Kant's Moral Philosophy

在《规范性的来源》中,科尔斯戈德通过区分定言命令与道德法则,引入人的实践同一性概念,从而解决了规范性的来源问题。然而,她的这一区分及其引入的实践同一性概念却遭到了内格尔和柯亨等人的批评:内格尔认为科尔斯戈德的这种解释引入了相对主义因素,偏离了康德的道德哲学;柯亨则认为科尔斯戈德这种解释一方面本身不能融贯,另一方面也偏离了康德的道德哲学。试图在重构科尔斯戈德论证的基础上,逐一回应上述批评,进而表明,科尔斯戈德的这种解释并未偏离康德的道德哲学,而是对康德道德哲学的一种推进。

In The Source of Normativity by Christine M Korsgaard has solved the problem of the source of normativity by distinguishing the categorical imperative and the moral law, and introducing the concept of human identity. However, her distinctions and the introduction of the concept of practical identity have been criticized by Thomas Nagel and G. A. Cohen：Nagel argues that Korsgaard＇s interpretation may introduce a relativistic factor which deviates Kant＇s moral philosophy;Cohen argues that,on the one hand,the interpretation of Korsgaard＇s incoherent in itself,and it also deviates from Kant＇s moral philosophy on the other hand. This paper attempts to respond to the above criticism on the basis of the reorganization of Korsgaard＇s argument, and shows that this interpretation of Korsgaard does not deviate from Kant＇s moral philosophy, but rather a promotion of Kant＇s moral philosophy.