管理层激励对盈余管理行为影响的博弈分析

Game Analysis on the Impacts of Managerial Incentives on Earnings Management

针对管理层激励对盈余管理行为的影响,根据应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的不同特点,建立管理层与股东之间的盈余管理博弈模型,讨论薪酬激励和管理层持股两种常见激励措施对管理层盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果表明,无论是否持有本企业股份,管理层均会采取盈余管理行为,未持有本企业股份的管理层更倾向于实施真实盈余管理。固定薪酬不会引发管理层盈余管理行为,而基于盈余的奖励薪酬会增加管理层应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理水平。管理层持股会导致管理层的盈余管理行为发生变化,引起管理层增加应计盈余管理水平,但对真实盈余管理及整体盈余管理水平的影响受真实盈余管理对企业价值破坏程度的制约。

This paper examines the impacts of managerial incentives on earnings management. Based on the different characteristics of accrual-based earnings management（AEM） and real earnings management（REM）,a game model between managers and shareholders is established to analyze how compensation incentive and managerial ownership influence earnings management.The results show that the managers will manage the earnings whether the mangers own shares,while the managers who don＇t hold shares tend to implement REM. The fixed compensation doesn＇t incur earnings management while rewarding compensation based on the accounting earning increases both AEM and REM. The research also proves that it contributes to the change of earnings management behavior. Managerial ownership can increase AEM,while its influence on REM and total earnings management is restricted by the damage degree of REM on firm value.