基于演化博弈的工程监理寻租问题研究

Research on Rent-seeking of Engineering Supervision Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

针对工程建设领域监理寻租问题,构建承包商、监理单位和业主三方之间的演化博弈模型,探讨各主体行为策略空间和寻租影响因素。研究结果表明:罚款金额、名誉损失、奖励制度等因素会影响到监理单位策略的选择。对于业主来说,监督成本的大小会直接影响到其监督的力度。承包商的决策不仅受到业主监督概率的影响,还与监理单位合谋意愿的强弱有关。同时,用Matlab进行仿真分析,研究不同初始条件下各参与主体的演化稳定策略,并提出相关建议与对策。

For rent-seeking of engineering supervision,the evolutionary game model among the contractor,superintendent and employer is built which aims to analyze participants＇ strategies and factors affecting rent-seeking. The results show that factors such as the fines,reputational damage,incentive system and so on will influence superintendent＇ s choice. For employer,monitoring cost will directly affect his probability of supervision. The strategy of contractor will be affected by employer＇s decision and be related to superintendent＇s will of conspiracy. Meanwhile,using Matlab simulation to analyze each participant＇s evolutionary stable strategy under the different initial condition and suggestions and countermeasures are put forward.