基于前景理论的政企低碳策略演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Low-carbon Strategies of Government and Business Based on the View of Prospect Theory

从前景理论视角分析地方政府监督下的企业低碳生产策略,建立企业和地方政府的收益感知矩阵,运用复制动态方程分析企业和地方政府的低碳策略演化博弈过程,模拟分析环境恶化风险成本、惩罚成本、低碳补贴及地方政府收益变化对演化结果的影响。研究结果表明:企业和地方政府的低碳策略取决于对方低碳策略的选择和参数感知价值,参数感知价值围绕临界值上下波动时,低碳策略随之变化;在一定条件下,企业和地方政府的低碳策略演化为环境效益最大化的企业低碳生产、地方政府监督策略集合;企业和地方政府对损益价值的感知大小影响环境效益最大化的实现;企业选择低碳生产及地方政府选择监督的概率影响策略收敛的速度。

Based on the prospect theory, enterprise＇s low-carbon production strategies were analyzed under the supervision of local government. Perceived payoff matrix of enterprise and local government has been established. Evolution game model of low-carbon strategies between enterprise and local government has been built by replicator dynamics equations. Numerical simulation has been taken to analyze the costs of environmental degradation risk, cost of punishment, government subsidies and interests＇ effect on evolutionary results. The results show that： low- carbon strategies of businesses and local governments depend on the choice of counterpart and the parameter perceived value. When parameters fluctuate around the perception threshold, low-carbon strategies change with the value; Under a certain condition, low-carbon strategies evolve to the set that enterprises choose low-carbon production and local governments choose supervision, which can maximize the environmental benefits. The enterprise and local governments＇ profit and loss perceived value influences profit maximization; The probability of enterprises low-carbon production and local governments supervision affects the speed of convergence.