威廉斯论道德相对主义

Bernard Williams on Moral Relativism

伯纳德·威廉斯提出过一套名为"距离的相对主义"的理论,认为"我们"应该悬置对于遥远的古代或者未来生活的道德判断,因为"我们"无法转投到古代或者未来的道德系统中生活,因而与它们只处于"名义上的对抗"。结合威廉斯"内在理由"的主张,系统地重构出他对于"距离的相对主义"的论证,由此可以发现,威廉斯对"名义上的对抗"这一相对主义适用条件的刻画,并不足以保证相对主义只适用于古代或者未来的道德观。

Bernard Williams proposes a doctrine called "relativism of distance",which he claims to be the truth of relativism.According to this doctrine,we should suspend our moral judgments of the distantly past or future,because there is no way for us of going over those outlooks and hence they stand in merely notional confrontation with our own outlook.In this paper,I shall clarify and examine this doctrine.I argue that Williams' s distinction between real and notional confrontation cannot serve his purpose of confining the suspension of moral appraisal only to diachronic confrontations.To prove this point,I will,based on other parts of Williams' s ethical thought,reconstruct his argument for relativism of distance.