回报性互利、惩罚性互利与小型农田水利设施自愿合作供给——基于Z村的个案研究

Rewarding Mutual Benefit, Punitive Mutual Benefit and Voluntary Cooperation Supply of Small-scale Irrigation System: A Case Study of Z Village

村庄成员利益明显受到建设田间水渠和维护支渠工作的影响,研究在国家大规模投入农田水利设施的情况下,村庄成员是否会组织起来合作提供并维护这些小规模工程,对农田水利设施的可持续发展具有重要意义。本文构建集体行为的行为人模型,通过案例研究,探讨基础性的行为规范(公平互利性)能否促成小型农田水利设施自愿合作供给。个案研究表明,在管护小型农田水利设施上,回报性互利难以形成,而在破坏小型农田水利设施上,村庄成员通过多回合博弈形成了畸形的"回报性互利",惩罚性互利失效,其结果是末级渠道和田间工程配套的维护、管理等陷入了困境,小型农田水利设施自愿合作供给难以实现。在国家提供了大规模的农田水利设施后,村庄成员难以组织起来合作提供并维护田间水渠与支渠,导致农田有效灌溉率低,农田灌溉成本较高。针对小型农田水利设施自愿合作供给困难的现象,本文建议,在鼓励农地流转的同时,通过建立有效的惩罚机制及重构共享规范,使村庄中经营规模小且地块分散的小农户合作供给小型农田水利设施。

The interests of the village members are clearly influenced by the construction of field canals and the maintenance of branch canals.Study on whether the members of the village will organize and cooperate in the provision and maintenance of these small-scale projects in the case of large-scale investment in small-scale irrigation systems in the country is of great significance to the sustainable development of small-scale irrigation systems.This paper constructs an actor model of collective action,and explores whether the basic code of conduct(fairness and mutual benefit)can contribute to the voluntary cooperation supply of small-scale irrigation systems in the absence of social capital by the case study.Case study shows that it is difficult to form rewarding mutual benefit in the management of small-scale irrigation systems,however,it forms the deformed'rewarding mutual benefit'through village members’multi-round game and punitive mutual benefit is inoperative in the destruction of smallscale irrigation systems,and these lead to the maintenance and management of field canals and branch canals into a predicament,and makes it difficult to achieve voluntary cooperation supply of small-scale irrigation systems.After the government provides large-scale irrigation systems,it is difficult for the village members to organize and cooperate in the provision and maintenance of field canals and branch canals,resulting in low farmland effective irrigation rate and high farmland irrigation costs.In view of the phenomenon of voluntary cooperation supply of small-scale irrigation systems difficult to achieve,the more appropriate way is to encourage the transfer of farmland,at the same time,to promote small scale and scattered households to cooperatively supply small-scale irrigation systems through the establishment of an effective punishment mechanism and the reconstruction of shared norms.