携号转网政策对电信运营商合谋的影响研究

The Influence of Number Portability Policy on Collusion of Telecommunication Operators

电信业是一个典型的寡头垄断产业,在运营过程中,电信运营商容易达成合谋,同时电信市场较高的转移成本为电信运营商合谋提供一定的基础。本文通过构建博弈模型,研究携号转网政策对电信运营商合谋的影响效应。研究得出:实施携号转网政策,通过有效降低消费者的转移成本,使得电信运营商坚持合谋的临界贴现因子提高,电信运营商将更难坚持合谋。该政策的实施效果随转移成本降低率的提高而增强,随电信运营商产品差异性的不断扩大而减弱。因此,携号转网政策的实施将在一定程度上降低电信运营商的合谋行为。

The telecommunication industry is a typical oligopoly industry,telecom operators are easy to collusion in the course of operation,while higher transfer costs provide a certain basis for collusion of telecom operators in the telecommunication market. In this paper,we construct the game model to study the effect of the number portability policy on the collusion of telecom operators. The results show that the collusion between telecom operators will become more difficult when the switching cost decreases and the critical value of collusion rises. The effect of the number portability policy will be increased with enhance of transfer cost reduction rate and weaken with expansion of the telecom product differentiation.Therefore,the implementation of the number portability policy will be reduce the collusion of telecom operators.