摘要
本文基于预购众筹、P2P和股权众筹3种互联网金融模式的投融资决策过程,分别构建了投资者和创业企业(融资者)为决策主体的两阶段完全信息动态博弈模型,采用逆向选择法求取了纳什均衡,并分别详解了创业企业通过3种互联网融资渠道融资所获取的最优利润及其影响因素。研究发现,创业企业的融资目标金额、投资者获取的额外效用及收益贴现率是决定最优利润及其排序的关键指标。借助我国金融市场参数和互联网金融投资者偏好参数对收益贴现率和额外效用赋值后发现:随着创业企业融资目标金额的增加,创业企业为获取最优利润会依次优选预购众筹、P2P、股权众筹渠道进行融资。我国互联网金融平台的统计数据印证了这一结论。
This paper based on the investment and financing decision-making process of pre-ordering crowdfunding,P2 P and equity crowdfunding three kinds of Internet financial models,are constructed by investors and venture enterprises(financing)for the decision-making body of the dynamic game model of two stage incomplete information,we adopt the adverse selection method to get the Nash equilibrium,and explain the factors of the optimal profit and the influence of three kinds of Internet financing channels for financing obtained by enterprises. It is find that the financing target amount,the additional utility obtained by investors and the discount rate of earnings are the key indicators to determine the optimal profit and its sort. With the financial market parameters and Internet financial investor preference parameters in China on income discount rate and additional utility assignment find that with increasing financing target enterprise value,enterprise in order to obtain the optimal profit are preferred pre chips,P2 P mode,to raise public equity financing channels. Statistical data of China's Internet financial platform confirms this conclusion.
出处
《工业技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第11期139-146,共8页
Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基金
河北省科技计划项目"促进京津冀产业对接与转移的思路与对策研究"(项目编号:15457634D)
河北省科学基金项目"京津冀环境治理协作中的河北省对策"(项目编号:HB14YJ083)
河北省高等学校人文社会科学项目研究"京津冀大气污染物排放权初始分配机制及我省对策研究"(项目编号:SD171046)
关键词
子博弈纳什均衡
P2P
预购众筹
股权众筹
互联网金融
融资
subgame Nash equilibrium model
P2P
pre-ordering crowdfunding
equity crowdfunding
internet
nance
financing