中国商业银行激励机制的棘轮效应与风险承担

Ratchet Effect of Chinese Commercial Banks' Incentive System and their Operational Risks

基于委托—代理理论建立两阶段棘轮效应模型,利用2002~2014年中国39家商业银行的非平衡面板数据,对银行业激励机制棘轮效应的存在性以及其与银行风险承担之间的关系进行了实证研究。研究发现,排除银行资产规模、收入等影响因素,大部分商业银行存在考核业绩指标只增不减的现象,激励机制的棘轮效应较为明显,激励机制的棘轮效应增加了银行经营风险。因此,中国银行业应充分考虑风险因素,优化银行激励考核机制,防止过度追求短期目标而忽略了风险的行为,实施稳健的经营发展战略。

Based on the principal- agent theory, this study constructs a two- stage ratchet effect model. This study then collects unbalanced panel data for 39 commercial banks in China from 2002 to 2014 to conduct an empirical analysis of the existence of the ratchet effect of banks＇ incentive systems and their relationship with operational risk. The findings show that, without con- sidering factors such as income and the value of assets, the performance target of the most com- mercial banks tends to increase rather than decrease every year, and the ratchet effect of the in- centive system becomes apparent, resulting in an increase in operational risk. Therefore, the banking industry in China should take full account of potential risk factors, and optimize the in- centive and assessment systems to prevent overemphasis of short - term goals while ignoring po- tential risks to achieve a sound business development strategy.