旧村改造的三方进化博弈研究

Study on the Three-party Evolutionary Game of Old Village Reconstruction

首先,依据进化博弈理论,构建政府、开发商和原村民三方的进化博弈模型,并对此进行行为分析和均衡分析。研究结果表明,投机罚款和政府需承担的改造成本影响政府的策略选择,投机罚款和村民的配合度影响开发商的策略选择,政府公信力、村民需承担的改造成本、改造后收益和开发商采取投机行为对其造成的损失程度影响原村民的策略选择。基于此,针对改造三方提出相关的建议,做到目标和责任共担。

First of all, according to the evolutionary game theory, we construct the game model of government, developer and original villagers and carry out the behavior analysis and equilibrium analysis are. The results show that the speculation fine and cost affect the strategic choice of government, speculation fines and villagers ＂co-ordination affect the strategic choice of developer, government credibility, cost, profits and loss affect the strategic choice of original villagers. Based on this, it gives relative suggestions.