摘要
中国政府对基层社会的治理存在着一种稳定的模式,所谓"控制与自治相结合模式"。在清代,这种模式体现为保甲体系与乡绅和宗族自治系统同时并存;在当代,体现为网格化管理与村民(社区)自治同时并存。此种治理模式之形成原因,是现有的理解中国基层社会治理逻辑的两种主要理论——"官治能力受限论"和"社会风险论"——所不能完全解释的。我们认为,"控制与自治相结合模式"之形成,是政府在治理基层社会上,既需要降低官民冲突的风险,同时,也致力于控制和消除社会中的威胁因素,所导致的结果。通过考察清代基层社会的"控制与自治相结合模式"的形成原因,并与当代基层社会的治理模式相比较,为这种观点提供了经验支持;并且,把这种观点发展成解释基层社会治理逻辑的更一般化的风险理论。
There is a stable pattern when Chinese government regulates the grass-root society,which called the dual-track system of regulation and autonomy. This pattern embodied as the combination of Baojia system and clan autonomy in Qing dynasty;the integration of grid management and village self-governance in modern China. Existing theories,known as'the theory of limited governance capacity'and 'the theory of social risks',which aim to explain the logic of grass-root social governance in china,fail to account to this pattern. The origins of the dual-track system,this paper argues,stems from a dilemma encountered by the government,that the ruling authority has to eliminate the risks of officials-people conflict,at the same time,to alleviate latently threatening factors.By comparing the Qing dynasty's controlling system of grass-root society and modern counterparty,this paper finds some empirical evidence for this point of view. Moreover,this paper makes an effort to extend our argument to a generalized theory articulating the logic of social governance in a Prefectures-and-Counties State.
出处
《学术界》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第10期216-227,共12页
Academics
关键词
郡县制国家
社会风险
基层社会治理模式
prefectures-and-counties state
social risks
grass-root governance