知识归因的实践转向

Pragmatic Encroachment in Knowledge Ascription

传统的知识论认为知识是得到辩护的真信念。知识和真信念的区别应该属于理论理性的范畴。语境主义延续了这个传统,认为"S知道p"的语义值是由语境中说话者的心理状态所决定的。在不同的语境中,"知道"表达了知识不同的标准。通过将日常语言语境和怀疑论语境区别开,语境主义保留了我们的日常知识。但是自身理论的缺陷以及对知识归因的局限性,导致语境主义陷入巨大困境。意识到这点的哲学家们开始将目光转向认知主体的实际环境,将知识和实践行为联系起来。他们发现知识归因的真值会随着认知主体所处的实际风险的改变而改变。决定知识归因的因素还应该包括那些属于实践理性范围的。这种观点的转变,标志着知识归因的实践转向。

Epistemology has traditionally conceived of knowledge as a justified true belief. The differences between true belief and knowledge are matters that fall within the purview of theoretical rationality. Contextualism which succeed this standpoint has argued that the semantic value of a predicate ＇ S knows p＇ is determined by the mental state of the speaker in the context. ＇ Know＇ expresses different standards related to different contexts. Contextualism has maintained our ordinary knowledge via distinguishing the ordinary context from the skeptical context. However, the narrow perspective on the knowledge ascription and its own theoretical defects have made Contextualism into a great trouble. Philosophers who realized this fact have begun to investigate the practical environment of the subject. In connecting knowledge with practical action, they have discovered that the truth value of a knowledge ascription is dependent on the practical interests of the subject. The factors which determine the truth value of a knowledge ascription should also include those that fall within the purview of practical rationality. This change of standpoint is considered as pragmatic encroachment in knowledge ascription.