控股股东股权质押与公司违规

Controlling Shareholder's Share Pledge and Corporate Fraud

以2004—2015年我国A股上市公司为样本,采用部分可观测的Bivariate Probit模型研究控股股东股权质押对公司违规(违规倾向和违规稽查)的影响。研究发现:控股股东股权质押提高了公司违规后被稽查的概率,降低了公司的违规倾向;相对于国有企业,非国有企业控股股东股权质押对公司违规的影响更强;相对于非信息披露违规,控股股东股权质押对信息披露违规的影响更加明显。此外,控股股东股权质押公司的媒体报道数量更多,从而提高了公司违规后被稽查的概率,抑制了公司的违规倾向。

Using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2015 and the＂Bivariate Probit＂model with partial observability, this paper finds that controlling shareholder＇s share pledge can significantly increase the probability of fraud detection and reduce the likelihood of corporate frauds. Specifically, the investigation reveals that controlling shareholder＇s share pledge has more impact on the fraud propensity related to information disclosure, same as that in privately-owned firms. Furthermore, we also find that, controlling shareholder＇s share pledge can bring a high media exposure, which could significantly increase the probability of fraud detection and decrease the likelihood of corporate frauds.