管理层权力、生命周期与会计稳健性

Managerial Power,Life Cycle and Accounting Conservatism

以我国2007-2015年上市公司为考察对象,运用Khan-Watts模型,实证检验了企业处于生命周期不同阶段时,管理层权力对会计稳健性的影响。研究发现:管理层权力与会计稳健性显著负相关,即企业管理层权力的膨胀会损害公司的会计稳健性;企业生命周期会影响管理层权力与会计稳健性的关系,当企业处于成长期和衰退期时,管理层权力与会计稳健性的负相关关系会显著高于成熟期。从企业生命周期的视角来剖析企业管理层权力对会计稳健性的影响,不仅丰富了生命周期和管理层权力方面的研究,也为会计稳健性原则在我国的合理运用提供足够的经验证据。

Based on the listed companies in China during 2007 -2015, this paper uses Khan - Watts （2009） model to empirically test the influence of management rights on accounting conservatism in different stages of life cycle. The results show that： managerial power and accounting conservatism negatively related to the expansion of accounting conservatism will damage the company＇s management power; enterprise life cycle will affect the relationship between the managerial power and accounting conservatism, when the enterprise is in the growth stage and decline stage, a negative correlation between the managerial power and accounting conservatism will be significantly higher mature period. This paper analyzes the influence of enterprise managerial power on accounting conservatism from the perspective of enterprise life cycle, research not only enrich the life cycle and management power, but also for accounting conservatism in the rational use of China to provide sufficient empirical evidence.